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Spis treści

The English School's theory of International Society: a valuable concept to understand International Relations
Teoria społeczeństwa międzynarodowego szkoły angielskiej: cenna koncepcja dla zrozumienia stosunków międzynarodowych

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This article aims to explore International Relations through the lenses of the English School and through the case study of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Cop26. In particular, the article aims to analyse the most notable concept created by the English School: International Society. To do so, the article starts off with a brief overview of the English School to cover its history and its place in IR, and then presents its three main concepts: International System, International Society, and World Society. Focusing on International Society, the article proceeds to describe the two main theoretical approaches of the International Society, that is Pluralism and Solidarism. Moreover, the article presents the debate between Order and Justice within the International Society. Finally, the article presents the existing international cooperation coping with climate change through the case study of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Cop26. The article presents it by applying the principles of the International Society and aims to demonstrate the reasons why the English School and International Society are better suited concepts than the more traditional theories of IR to understand why there exists international cooperation to deal with climate change.

Keywords: IR, English School, International Society, UNFCCC.

The English School: A Brief Overview

The English School (ES) came into being in the late 1950s with the foundation of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, when a group of UK scholars set out to explore international relations (IR) in a different way from the American scholars of IR. The ES scholars were more concerned "with the historical than the contemporary, with the normative than the scientific, with the philosophical than the methodological, with the principles than policy" (Butterfield, Wight, 1966).

The ES is usually considered to be the middle ground (Dunne, 2011) between neorealism and neoliberalism in the theories of International Relations (IR). Like neorealism and neoliberalism, the ES too believes that states are the primary actors in the international anarchy. Unlike neorealism and neoliberalism, however, the ES adopts a historical, interpretive and normative approach (Jackson, Sørensen, 2013) to understand the complex world of IR.

The scholars of the ES refuse to believe in the neorealist premise that the world of IR is explicable through the competition, which is based on the material capabilities, among states. At the same time, the scholars of the ES do not believe in the neoliberal interpretation of IR as a community, based on human progress, which is in constant evolution and strives for a perpetual peace (Jackson, Sørensen, 2013).

The scholars of the ES regard "international relations as a society of states in which the principal actors are states-people who are specialized in the practice of statecraft. It views statecraft as a very important human activity" (Jackson, Sørensen, 2013, p. 134). The focus on human activity is what differentiates the international system from the international society. Barry Buzan, one of the most relevant personalities of the ES, defined the two in the following way: international system "is about power politics amongst states" (Buzan, 2001, p. 474); international society "is about the institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states" (Buzan, 2001, p. 475).

Together with world society – understood as "individuals, non-state organizations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities" (Buzan, 2001, p. 475) – international system and international society are the three main concepts developed by the ES. International system, international society and world society should not be understood as separate, independent concepts; on the contrary, they are interdependent, and together they form the world of IR. Notably, international society is the ES' most valuable concept to understand IR.

What is International Society?

Hedley Bull, another prominent scholar of the ES, affirmed that international society "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions" (Bull, 2012, p. 13).

States are the main actors in the international society. Once states realise that they have a certain degree of shared values, norms, identities and interests with other states, then they are likely to form an international society – which is based on such values, norms, identities and interests. However, states have to mutually recognise each other in order to create the international society.

Such mutual recognition is a form of social practice that is necessary to build an identity relationship. It is this societal element that brings states together in the first place, and that consolidates them throughout time. In Buzan's words, indeed, international society "puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of the IR theory" (Buzan, 2004, p. 7).

An international society is not only about cooperation due to some shared norms, rules, values and institutions. Buzan believes that the international society is built upon five primary institutions: balance of power, international law, diplomacy, great power management and war (Buzan, 2004).

Although these five institutions are the pillars of the international society, they are not all about cooperation. Therefore, international society is not necessarily all about cooperation and shared interests, it is also about conflict and about the relationships between different institutions of international societies that ultimately shape international order.

Pluralist or Solidarist International Society?

"Is international society a system for preserving the distinctiveness and independence of states within a limited framework of shared rules, or does it develop […] into increasing degrees of harmonisation and integration […], not to mention intervention?" asks Buzan (Buzan, 2001). The question can be answered differently according to how we understand international society – either a pluralist or a solidarist one.

The pluralist international society "adheres to a more traditional conception of IR" (Murray, 2016, p. 2) that highlights the role played by sovereign states. Indeed, in a pluralist international society, the institutional groundwork is based upon the presuppositions that states maintain order among them (Dunne, 2011). States are sovereign, and "sovereignty is about the cultivation of political difference and distinctness" (Buzan, 2001). This is why, in the pluralist international society, states adopt a non-interference policy and do not meddle with other sovereign states (Jackson, Sørensen, 2013). In this case, "the scope for international society is fairly minimal, centred on shared concerns about international order under anarchy" (Buzan, 2001, p. 478).

The solidarist international society, however, answers the question differently. Buzan affirms that "the potential scope for international society is somewhat wider, possibly embracing shared norms about such things as limitations on the use of force, and acceptable 'standards of civilisation' with regard to the relationship between states and citizens (that is, human rights)" (Buzan, 2001, p. 478).

A solidarist international society "was thought of as prioritising justice" (Kaczmarska, 2017, p. 8) because "states have duties to humanity" (Kaczmarska, 2017, p. 4). Indeed, the solidarist international society sees individuals as important actors in the international society – which is why individuals have the right to be protected by their states. This means that sovereign states can interfere with other sovereign states if, for example, the citizens are victims of great sufferance perpetrated by their own state (Jackson, Sørensen, 2013).

Order and Justice in the International Society

Because states are sovereign, they can recognise each other and form an international society. However, precisely because they are sovereign, states are also responsible for what happens in the international society. Thus, what is the scope of the international society?

Bull thinks that states should guarantee international order (Bull, 2012). Indeed, the responsibility to preserve international order – that is the order among states – lies in the hands of the sovereign states. States should do so by managing their relations with one another. However, as Bull affirms (Bull, 2012), this claim has a normative character: states should, indeed, guarantee order in the international society, but this does not mean that states actually do so. Bull remarks that "great powers, like small powers, frequently behave in such a way as to promote disorder rather than order" (Bull, 2012, pp. 199–201).

In other words, the main goal of international society is the promotion and preservation of international order. The responsibility for sustaining order between states belongs to the great powers (Jackson, Sørensen, 2013). The fact that states, being the primary actors in the international society, should be responsible for guaranteeing and preserving order in the international society is also connected with the concept of justice.

Bull affirms that justice "in any of its forms, is realisable only in a context of order" (Bull, 2012, p. 82). Therefore, "international society, by providing a context of order of some kind, […] may be regarded as paving the way for the equal enjoyment of rights of various kinds. It is true also that international society at present, through such nearly universal organs as the United Nations and its specialised agencies, is formally committed to much more than the preservation of minimum order or coexistence: it espouses ideas of international or interstate justice, and of individual or human justice" (Bull, 2012, p. 82).

Case Study: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change & COP26

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an example that can help us understand how international society can work in practice. The UNFCCC was drafted in May 1992 and came into force in March 1994. As of today, 197 states have ratified the Convention and are its active Parties. The primary goal of the UNFCCC, as stated in Article 2, is "to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (UN, 1992).

According to the UN, this was a remarkable historical moment – several states around the world recognised that there was (and there still is) a serious threat related to climate change, which is caused by human activities, and that affects all individuals and states in the world (What Is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change? | UNFCCC, n.d.). Therefore, the Convention bounded sovereign states to act in the interests of human safety – a concept that is, indeed, connected to justice, as mentioned by Bull.

The elements highlighted in the UNFCCC were ratified and specified further in the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in December 1997, but entered into force in 2005. The main goal of the Kyoto Protocol is to bind "developed countries, and

places a heavier burden on them under the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities, because it recognises that they are largely responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere". (What Is the Kyoto Protocol? | UNFCCC, n.d.).

As a consequence of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the yearly Conferences of the Parties (COP) have been organised every year since 1995. The latest, COP26, took place in Glasgow in November 2021. There, states agreed on pursuing the following goals: secure global net-zero by mid-century (2030) and keep 1.5 degrees within reach, adapt to protect communities and natural habitats, mobilise finance, and work together to deliver (COP26 Goals – UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) at the SEC – Glasgow 2021, n.d.).

Conclusive remarks

Why do almost all states in the world cooperate when it comes to climate change? Why do sovereign states – in spite of their different values, norms and identities – agree on certain common measures that they deem necessary to prevent global temperatures from rising even higher and causing irreversible damage? More generally, why are there norms of international character that prohibit certain behaviour of states, or that oblige them to behave in a specific manner and not in another?

Neorealism and neoliberalism cannot answer these questions satisfactorily. Neorealism affirms that states can cooperate if they are going to achieve something out of such cooperation. At the same time, neoliberalism cannot give a satisfying answer either because states do not necessarily cooperate all the time. International society, on the contrary, helps us answer the questions. Sovereign states, operating within the international society, recognise that there is a common problem and that, irrespective of their own values and interpretations of such problem, they need to act together to solve it.

International society goes beyond the dichotomy 'either/or': conflict and cooperation both exist in the international society because states are not constantly conflictual and/or cooperative. This is why the concept of international society is valuable: international society provides a solid framework to understand how IR works in a more comprehensive and inclusive way.

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India-Japan relations since 2000:
A normative perspective

Relacje indyjsko-japońskie od 2000 roku: Perspektywa normatywna

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This article explains the role of norms in IR with respect to particular focus on the bilateral security relationship between India and Japan since 2000. The article deals with the following questions, which are the normative driving factors between India and Japan to come together and cooperate? And how are those norms playing a major role in bringing them together? The article also analyzes the three liberal assumptions made by Andrew Moravcsik with Indo-Japan. And at the conclusion, it asserts that norms have been playing a major role between Indo-Japan relations since 2000.

Introduction of Normative Approach in IR

The study of International Relations (IR) is important to understand the behavior of a nation-state. Normative approach in IR is one of the important approaches to understand the nation-state's behavior amongst each other under the international system. The dominant 'realist' school of thought in IR explains "how states interact with each other or what it is"; on the other hand, normative approach stretches its focus upon 'what ought to be done' or how states should behave in international system based on common norms and values to sustain peace in the world. The study of normative approach in IR is to understand why states behave as they behave and how they should behave. The study is also important to build an international structure, system and societies based on universal norms and common values to construct a peaceful international system.

Indo-Japanese Co-operation since 2000

India and Japan are the emerging powers in the world and are perceived as major players in the security architecture of Asia and the Indo-Pacific. India is considered as a great power (Pardesi, 2015) and Japan is a major economic and technical hub for the world. Both countries are rising economies and share similar democratic ideas and values. Since the beginning of 21st century the relations between the India and Japan started enhancing across the sectors such as economics, technics, culture, security, defence and climate change etc.

The foundation of Indo-Japanese relations in the 21st century was Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's visit to India in August 2000, when he met his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (MEA India, 2013). They established 'global partnership in the 21st century'. In October 2008, India and Japan signed 'Joint declaration on security cooperation between India and Japan'. According to the both agreements they have agreed to cooperate in the areas such as: commitment to democracy, mutual stakes in each other's progress and prosperity, security in Asia and beyond, counterterrorism, non-

-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), disarmament, nuclear issues, long term stability of peace in Afghanistan, strengthening and reforms in the United Nations (UN), security of international maritime traffic and international shipping lanes, disaster management, countering arms, human and drugs trafficking (MOFA Japan, 2001) and many others.

To achieve those aforementioned goals, India and Japan have established the mechanisms such as maritime exercises, intelligence and information sharing, access to the port facilities, talks on Presidential and Prime ministerial level, 2+2 dialogues, talks on a military and diplomatic level on regular basis etc.

How and why do India and Japan come together? Areas of cooperation and the role of norms

The Indo-Japanese cooperation can be analyzed from global, regional and bilateral level in at least 10 different areas:

1. To construct and shape regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific – being emerging economies and major powers in Asia and across the Indo--Pacific region, India and Japan both have agreed to cooperate and enhance strategic partnership to maintain rule-based world order, and to make a peaceful and prosperous region. Free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region is a common agenda between India and Japan. Both countries are cooperating to deal with a variety of global and regional security issues in the region;

2. Strengthening democracy and rule of law – India and Japan are both democratic countries, they share democratic norms and values. Respect for international law, rule-based world order, as well as peaceful resolution of disputes within the region and around the globe is their common agenda. E.g., India-Bangladesh resolved their maritime dispute according to a UN resolution (Habib, 2014);

3. Maritime security – Japan is an island country; India has a 7716 km coastline with 2,3 mil km^2 exclusive economic zone. Both are maritime countries. They have more than 90% of trade by sea routes. India and Japan both are dependent on energy resources from Gulf countries. That is why the protection

of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) is a significant aspect to serve their geoeconomics and geostrategic interests. Thus, both countries insist upon to maintain rule of law in oceans and engaged for cooperation in counter piracy and counter maritime terrorism in Indo-Pacific region. Non-proliferation of WMD is a major security concern across the globe in which both the countries are agreed to cooperate. The proliferation of WMD takes place from maritime routes. That is why maritime security is a major common agenda within two states;

4. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations – the geographical expansion of the Indo-Pacific region is vast; the uncertain climate and weather creates disaster in the region. E.g. Indo-Pacific countries severely affected by the 2004 tsunami. The foundation of Quad (US, Japan, India, Australia) had place after the 2004 tsunami incident;

5. Counterterrorism – the South Asia and East Asia both are facing terrorism in the region. It is a grave threat to the world. Terrorism violates international laws and norms, thus India and Japan committed to fight against terrorism. Japanese and India militaries annually conducts counterterrorism military exercises. As well as, both have intelligence sharing agreement under the strategic cooperation;

6. Development programs in Afghanistan and Africa – India and Japan are engaging in development projects in Afghanistan to mitigate radicalization issues in the region. At the same time, both have common consensus to focus on the African continent for collective development plans. India and Japan are planning to further enhance cooperation on Asia-Africa economic corridor;

7. Cooperation in the United Nations – according to 1952's treaty of peace between India and Japan, both countries have agreed of maintenance of international peace and security in conformity with the principles of the charter of the United Nations (Choudhury, 2022, p. 282). The United Nations is the single platform where all the countries come together and discuss their issues to resolve. The UNSC (United Nations Security Council) has five permanent representatives who have 'veto' power during voting. India and Japan both are demanding to enhance the seats of permanent representatives in UNSC. Both

are pushing their case by supporting each other. India and Japan are part of G4 (Germany, Brazil, India, Japan) grouping which are pushing each other's bid to get permanent seat in UN. Apart from UNSC, India and Japan are active participants in UN peacekeeping operations. It shows their commitment and contribution to the global peace, security and in conflict resolution. Under the bilateral security agreement, both countries have agreed to enhance their security cooperation for regional and global peace;

8. To contain the assertive rise of China – China's historical claim over the South China Sea (SCS) is against the international law, particularly UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). China claims the entire territory of SCS with the islands popularly known as 'nine dash line' claim. The littoral countries of the SCS region consider it as a violation of UNCLOS. The strategist and policymakers both from India and Japan see it from the perspective of the violation of 'maritime territorial sovereignty'. S. Kalyanaraman, former research fellow at IDSA, India, said during his presentation in IDSA that "78% of wars from 1648 to 1945 were conquests for territories and redistribution of territories. From 1945-2000 it declined to 27%. And the major reason behind the decline of war for territorial conquest is the idea of territorial sovereignty and international norms under the United Nations which proscribed states to violate territorial integrity of other states" (Kalyanaraman, 2017). Widespread acceptance of international norms and preservation of status quo is important. In the 21st century with the context of East Asia, norms are getting violated by China in SCS. It plays a determinant normative factor between India and Japan. China's rise in South Asia is a negatively perceived in New Delhi. India and Japan are conducting joint development projects in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri-Lanka; as well as further planning in Africa. Basrur and Kutty in their article "Modi's India and Japan: nested strategic partnership", argued that India and Japan are using normative weapons to contain China and those shared norms are rule-based order and free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region (Basrur, Kutty, 2021). However, India and Japan both are balancing and cooperating with China, due to their complex economic interdependency with China;

9. Regional institutions – regional institutions play a major role in IR as well as it has significance in the literature of English School in IR. In the case of Indo-Japanese relations, Japan supported India's case for membership at the East Asian Summit (Jain, 2008). ASEAN is a one of the most important economic regional institutions in Indo-Pacific. India's has given ASEAN centrality in its vision towards the Indo-Pacific. The formation of QUAD grouping (US, India, Japan, Australia) in Indo-Pacific region is also considered as informal grouping and an emerging institution in the region to enhance strategic and comprehensive partnership;

10. Climate Change, energy and food security – due to the impact of climate change, India has set its objective of net-zero carbon emission by 2070. To achieve this objective, Japan can play a big role. Japan fulfills its energy requirements from nuclear energy, which is considered as clean energy. Nuclear cooperation is on agenda between the two countries, which would help India to reduce its carbon footprints. In 2016, India signed Civil Nuclear Cooperation with Japan. During earlier phases of discussion, Japan was not ready to sign a civil nuclear agreement with India, because India have nuclear weapons in its arsenals. However, over the period of time the talks had been progressed and the deal signed. India and Japan have common understanding that the nuclear energy should be used for the greater cause of humanity. Due to such de facto normative understanding, the talks progressed and civil nuclear cooperation deal signed.

Due to climate change, the degradation in food quality is another concern raised by the agriculture scientists of both countries. In order to find out the solution, academic and research institutions from India and Japan are cooperating in research with each other. They are also trying to inculcate information technology (IT), artificial intelligence (AI), internet of things (IoT) in the agriculture sector to enhance the quality of food (Ninomiya, 2022). In 2021 both countries agreed to establish a joint credit mechanism (JCM) and coalition for disaster resilience infrastructure (CDRI) (ANI, 2021).

An article by Andrew Moravcsik contributes a significant amount in the literature of normative approach in IR. Apart from the global, regional and bilateral security issues and norms, some of the liberal assumptions do play a role in bringing Japan and India together.

Core Assumptions of Liberal theory in IR

Andrew Moravcsik, a liberal IR scholar in his paper entitled "Taking preferences seriously: a liberal theory of international politics" mentioned following three core assumptions of liberal theory which are significant in the study of Normative approach in IR:

1. The primacy of societal actors
2. Representation and state preferences
3. Interdependence and international system.

'Primacy of societal actors' means role of individuals, historical and cultural linkages. It also plays a major role in IR. In the case of India and Japan, the famous Indian personalities like Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore, political leaders like former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe played a major role in bringing India and Japan socio-politically together. There are multiple cultural similarities between India and Japan, which makes them natural partners. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while addressing to the Indian diaspora during his visit to Tokyo in May 2022 highlighted the cultural similarities between the two states (Modi, 2022b). Table 1 shows that there are similar and parallel social believes between India and Japan.

Table 1.

India	Japan
Lord Shiva	Daikokuten
Brahma	Bonten
Mother Saraswati	Benzaiten
Mahadevi Lakshmi	Kichijoten
Ganesha	Kangiten
Meditation	Zen

Source: Author's own compilation based on data from Prime Minister's Address to the Indian Community in Tokyo, Japan (23rd May 2022); https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/35349/English_Translation_of_Prime_Ministers_address_to_the_Indian_Community_in_Tokyo_Japan.

India's great spiritual leader Swami Vivekananda and great poet Rabindranath Tagore both have praised Japan. They said, Japan is ancient and modern at the same time. There are spiritual similarities between India and Japan. Buddhism is another common factor which drives both countries to come together. India's Prime Minister N. Modi is himself a spiritually oriented personality and elected to the Indian parliament from the Banaras constituency, which is known as the cultural capital of India. Thus, spirituality as a societal factor plays a major role in Japan-India relations. The personal relationship and positive bond between Narendra Modi and former Japanese PM Shinzō Abe played a major role to enhance ties between India and Japan. PM Narendra Modi had relations with PM Abe when Modi was Chief Minister of Gujarat state in India. When PM Abe got killed and died on 8th July 2022; PM Modi wrote an article on Shinzō Abe, which has covered and published by daily newspapers in India.

As per the 2nd assumption of liberal theory of Andrew Moravcsik, 'representation and state preferences' also play a major role, that means the role of domestic government and regional policies. The Indian and Japanese industrial and economic sectors are engaging and interacting with each other. Both are having close cooperation and implementing developmental projects, e.g., Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train project, development projects in Gujarat or Japanese commitment of investment in the North-eastern region of India. The development of North Eastern region of India is essential for India's Act east policy. The Indian diaspora also plays a significant role in Indo-Japanese relations; many Indians went to Japan for the sake of employment and later they married and settled in Japan (Modi, 2022b). This is a significant variable that plays a role in bringing closer Indo-Japanese cooperation.

The third assumption is 'interdependence and international system'. India and Japan are closely cooperating to combat COVID-19 by vaccine diplomacy and Quad vaccine initiative. Climate change is another grave threat in front of humanity where both countries are having closer cooperation. Japan has advanced technology as well as experience to deal against natural calamities, which would help India to overcome disasters occurred due to natural calamities and climate change (Modi, 2022b). PM Modi in his speech at Tokyo asserted that

"Japan is playing a major role in India's growth" (Modi, 2022b). Domestically, India wants to become self-reliant in all possible sectors in which Japan plays a role, as well as stable and sustainable global supply chain build up is another target by both countries. This is how 'interdependence and international system' plays a role to bring India-Japan together for closer partnership.

Conclusion

Aspects mentioned above shows that India and Japan are closely cooperating to maintain rule-based world order, to strengthen the security of the region, and to make the region prosperous. Climate change, cyber and space security are newly emerging aspects in security on which both countries have agreed to cooperate. Rule of law, free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific are shared norms between India and Japan. China's assertive rise is also an important variable between the cooperation of India and Japan as both sees Chinese activities from the perspective of violation of norms. The liberal assumptions such as societal preferences, representation of state preferences and interdependence and international system plays a significant role in Indo-Japanese cooperation. Thus, to maintain and strengthen international norms, regional and global security cooperation based on shared norms and values are the dominant factor between India and Japan.

After the 'treaty of peace' signed between the government of Japan and India in June 1952, there is no 'norm' or 'rule agreement' as such has been signed between the two countries; however, their common and broader normative understanding towards the world, driving and shaping bilateral relationship based on normative principles.

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Land mines, climate change and norms.
What are the limitations of M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink "life cycle of norms"?

Miny lądowe, zmiana klimatu i normy.
Jakie są ograniczenia „cyklu życia norm" M. Finnemore i K. Sikkink?

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The purpose of this article is to demonstrate limitations of "life cycle of norms" concept proposed by M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink in their paper "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." using example of UN climate change policy (mostly UNFCCC) as a case study. Through analysis of UN documents on climate change and climate protection and its comparison to actions and statements taken by states, this paper argues that there is major difference between the internalization of norms – by meaning proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink – and actual implementation of norms. By the example of proposed case study, this paper proves that Finnemore and Sikkink's "life cycle of norms" concept has limitations which may be described as too general and too optimistic approach to the perception of stage 2 ("norm cascade") and stage 3 ("internalization") of cycle.

Keywords: Normative Approach, internalization of norms, impelentation of norms, UNFCCC, Ottawa Treaty.

Introduction

First presented in 1998 in the journal International Organization in the article International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, the concept of "life cycle of norms" by M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink provides a very clear and helpful model for understanding the process of emergence and further diffusion of international norms.

However, despite its undoubted advantages, Finnemore and Sikkink's concept has limitations, which can be most simply described as: 1) the difference between the internalization of norms and the actual implementation of norms, and 2) the inadequacy and imprecision of the model in relation to all types of norms.

In the case of the first limitation, the authors take an too general and too optimistic approach to perceiving stage 2 ("norm cascade") and stage 3 ("internalization") of the proposed cycle and equate two terms: internalization of norms and [actual] implementation of norms. This assumption is flawed for several reasons, two in particular seem worth articulating: the importance of the quantity and quality of actors adopting/implementing a norm, and the difference between formal recognition of a norm and its actual entry into force. In the case of the second limitation, the analysis of specific case studies leads to doubts about the possible effective use of Finnemore and Sikkink's model in the case of norms other than those concerning human rights.

To demonstrate these limitations, two case studies will be analyzed: 1) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty) and 2) the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The first case study was presented back by the authors in support of their proposed concept, but over the years it has become increasingly evident that the authors' predictions do not match reality. The second case study, new and independent from the previous one, analogically presents the same divergence of theory and practice.

Life cycle of norms

The foundation of the concept proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink is the division of the "life" of international norms into 3 stages: 1) norm emergence, 2) "norm cascade," and 3) internalization; a tipping point occurs between stage 1 and stage 2 (Figure 1). Each stage graduates the presence of the norm in social consciousness and public space, based on the actions of particular stage-specific actors who are guided by specified motives and use certain dominant mechanisms (Finnemore, Sikkink, 1998, p. 898).

Figure 1. Life cycle of norms

Source: Finnemore, M. Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization, vol. 52, 4*, p. 896.

Stage 1 involves the actions of bottom-up actors. These include the norm entrepreneurs and their organisational platforms, such as individuals, groups and NGOs. These actors often initiate the very concept of a norm (or the modification of an existing norm according to new guidelines) and then try to disseminate it in the widest possible circles. Depending on the nature and type of the norm, the target audience of norm entrepreneurs is decision-makers, decision-making groups, and/or the media in order to gain as much support as possible for the idea they are promoting. In stage 1, actors are mainly motivated by altruistic and ideological motives and are driven by empathy. Due to the limited legislative influence, the actors' actions are mainly limited to popularization of knowledge and persuasion according to the "logic of appropriateness".

The tipping point between stage 1 and stage 2 occurs when bottom-up norm entrepreneurs convince a certain number of states to their cause (the so-called critical mass), who then take over from them the role of norm entrepreneurs. The authors emphasize that the concept of "critical mass" is not precise and therefore it is difficult to determine how many states are needed to cross it, nevertheless, based on empirical research they give the number of 1/3 of all states in the world (system) necessary as an absolute minimum to cross the tipping point. This quantity may vary by different standards and depends primarily on the "weight" of individual states in the international arena – both locally and globally (Finnemore, Sikkink, 1998, p. 901).

The "norm cascade" stage (2) introduces a qualitative change in the dynamics of norm diffusion. Concepts and ideas previously propagated by actors with less influence, through the activities of states, international organizations and networks, gain more and more interest and, consequently, approval of more and more states, which then have the opportunity to join the role of entrepreneurs and further replicate and propagate norms using mechanisms of socialization, institutionalization and demonstration. Over time, an international "social pressure" effect is also created and developed, where the inter-

national community is responsible for the social factor. In stage 2, by far the motives of the actors – mainly states – are more diverse than in stage 1, as legitimacy, reputation and respect are distinguished. These motives, while they may be positive on principle, force one to wonder to what extent this "social pressure" makes some states adopt a given norm and to what extent the adoption of norms by states is sincere or apparent and opportunistic. The authors are aware of these concerns, but seem to assume the dominance of positive intentions of states and rulers.

The last (3) stage in the model proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink is internalization, which should be understood as "the extreme of a norm cascade, [when – A/N] norms may become so widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a ‹‹taken-for-granted›› quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic." (Finnemore, Sikkink, 1998, p. 904). In this stage, the norm-promoting actors are law, professions, and bureaucracy – in other words, the actors are still states or international organizations, but their activities are no longer directed "outward," i.e., to the international community, but "inward," i.e., to state communities. The main motive of actors in this stage is conformity to the norm (the need for some kind of standardization and professionalization), and the dominant mechanisms are institutionalization and habit (Finnemore, Sikkink, 1998, p. 898).

The above characteristics of the model, although brief and simplified, allow for an similarly brief and critical analysis. The first doubts arise in relation to the tipping point between stages 1 and 2 and are related to the concept of "critical mass". The authors are aware of the lack of precision of this concept, as already mentioned, but this lack directly implies the subsequent stages, only deepening the imprecision and reliance on contractual values. As will be described later, it is hard to imagine a "critical mass" without some of the "critical" actors, which in turn implies further doubts about the "cascade of norms" and, in particular, the internalization of norms and their actual implementation. Any doubts will be discussed in more detail later in the paper, during the description of the two case studies.

Case study no. 1: Ottawa Treaty

The examples used by the authors to illustrate their model can be divided into two groups: those devoted to human rights and those devoted to international humanitarian law. In the case of the first group of rights, represented mainly by women's suffrage, the effectiveness of the model proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink is clearly noticeable and

therefore there are no reasons to question the argumentation and conclusions of the authors – this will not be analyzed further. The second group is represented by the Ottawa Treaty, and this is quite a different case, heavily undermining the sense of the "life cycle of norms" concept.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, i.e. the Ottawa Treaty, was passed in December 1997 and entered into force in March 1999 (UN, 2022a). The authors thus base their argument not so much on the actual convention, but on the actions leading up to it. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that "in case of land mines, by May 1997 the number of states supporting the ban on anti-personnel land mines reached 60, or approximately one-third of the total states in the system. After that point, a norm cascade occurred, and 124 states ratified the Ottawa land mine treaty in December 1997." (Finnemore, Sikkink, 1998, p. 901).

The above argumentation is questionable for three reasons. First, referring to recent events (happening while the research is being conducted and the article is being prepared) is always fraught with considerable risk due to the changing nature of the reality under investigation. This is particularly important in the context of studying international relations. Secondly, the authors based their arguments on incomplete data (or even lack of data), which means that their argumentation is at least partly based on speculations, which may raise objections and criticism. Third and finally, the authors are imprecise in their argument – writing about the ratification of the treaty in 1997 by 124 states, the authors confuse signing the treaty, which is not directly binding and which does not yet have any legal consequences, with its ratification, which does have such consequences. If one compares the actual numbers regarding the ratification process of the Treaty, in the cited December 1997, it is possible to speak of 3 countries (Canada, Ireland, Mauritius), while by the time the Treaty entered into force (March 1999), a total of 67 countries had ratified or otherwise accepted or approved its provisions[1] (UN, 2022a). This represents more than 1/3 of all countries in the system (all countries in the world), but only slightly more than half of all countries that have signed the Treaty. Moreover, if one looks at the chronology of accession/ratification of the Treaty by subsequent states, it is difficult to see any pattern resulting from a "norm cascade"[2]. At the time of writing this article (June 2022), the Trea-

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[1] For the Treaty to enter into force, ratification by at least 40 countries was required, which occurred in September 1998.

[2] Counting from March 2, 1999, the numbers were as follows: 1999 - 23, 2000 - 19, 2001 -

ty has been ratified by 164 parties, so 33 states remain outside the Treaty. Significantly, among these 33 states are the 10 states[3] that currently have the largest land armies (Statista. com, 2022), the impact of which will be mentioned later.

The authors further address the role of individual states in the adoption of norms. Some states have been labeled "critical," meaning those that are crucial to the adoption of a particular norm. In the case of the Ottawa Treaty, Finnemore and Sikkink thus distinguished between insignificant states, which do not produce or use landmines, and significant states, that is, mine producers like France and the United Kingdom. According to the authors, the accession of both of these states in mid-1997 to the treaty support camp contributed to the subsequent "norm cascade" in late 1997 (Finnemore, Sikkink, 1998, p. 901). Two specific examples are also invoked to confirm the rule – South Africa's decision under Nelson Mandela strongly influenced other states both in Africa and globally (Finnemore, Sikkink, 1998, p. 901), while the United States' lack of decision and its attempts to justify it were supposed to indicate the general justification and legitimacy of the ban's implementation (Finnemore, Sikkink, 1998, p. 892). The section on "critical states" concludes by stating that the involvement and unanimity of all states recognized as such is not required for a "norm cascade" to occur.

In order to make a summary analysis of the treaty using the "life cycle of norms" model, therefore, inaccuracies can be traced to 2 of the 3 stages and the tipping point:

1. In the stage of norm emergence, the model performs well. The topic of a landmine ban came up from the bottom up in 1991, to be taken up a year later by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which became an advocate for it and whose actions led to the passing of a treaty in December 1997 (ICBL, 2012);

2. The support of the ban by 60 states by May 1997 (about one-third of the world's total) became, according to the authors, a tipping point followed by a "norm cascade". This assumption raises some doubts because verbal support, even of important states (France, Great Britain) is not equal to real international legal changes;

3. The "norm cascade" stage involves the signing of the Treaty by 124 states in December 1997. As mentioned, the authors have used misleading terminology

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13, 2002 - 8, 2003 - 11, after 2004 - 23. Moreover, there is also not some significant correlation resulting from the adoption of the Treaty by a country and the spread of the idea of its adoption to neighboring countries.

[3] These 10 countries include: China (PRC), India, the United States, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, South Korea, Vietnam, and Egypt.

in calling the signing a ratification. This error calls for serious reflection on the evaluation of the argumentation of the "norm cascade" stage itself, as well as the subsequent internalization stage;

4. The internalization stage was obviously not included in the authors' argumentation, but doubts and inaccuracies arising from the analysis so far also translate into it. Especially when considering the actual differences between internalization, implementation and the actual state of affairs.

Considering all the arguments given previously both in favour of Finnemore and Sikkink's conception and those that undermine it, an attempt can be made to compare the potential stage of internalisation (3), which according to the assumptions of the model can be observed today, with the actual state of international reality. Looking at the lists of states that have adopted and have not adopted the principles of the Treaty, it is difficult to resist the impression that the "weight" of the two lists differs significantly and that the states that have not adopted the Treaty have a greater importance in the international arena. Since it is difficult to equate the military (in the first place), population, economic and territorial potential of states such as the United States, China, India or Russia with states such as Belize, Cambodia, Sri Lanka or Lithuania. Therefore, if the countries that could actually be affected by the norm (restriction) are not parties to the agreement implementing the norm (restriction), it is difficult to talk about the real global impact of this norm (restriction). Also, the authors' claim that unanimity and commitment of all states considered "critical" are not necessary for a "norm cascade" to occur is hard to defend when the majority of "critical" states remain outside the norm. In other words, the cascade may have occurred, but as a result the norm does not turn into a rushing river that drives the international community, but rather spills over and slowly loses its momentum.

Case Study no. 2: UNFCCC

The second proposed case study addresses an area even different from those addressed by Finnemore and Sikkink, but equally important for contemporary international reality – the implementation of agreements on international climate protection[4]

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[4] By climate protection it is meant actions that aim to protect the environment in terms of water, land, air, atmosphere, etc. Due to the volume and nature of this work, these activities are covered synthetically and in a generalized manner to briefly outline the focus of the UNFCCC and to allow for an analysis of the Convention itself in the context of the "life cycle of norms".

cooperation. The main document in on this issue is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and it is its analysis that will be made.

The Convention was signed in May 1992, entered into force in March 1994, and almost all[5] (196) countries of the world and the European Union are parties to it (UN, 2022b). However, the "road" to the Convention itself began quite a bit earlier, with the rise of climate change awareness. For the purposes of this analysis, the beginning of this "road" will be set at the turn of the 1950s/60s, when the first scientific articles on global warming were published (Revelle, Suess, 1957; Keeling, 1960), which initiated the growth of interest in this topic in the scientific community (Pestler, 2021). In the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the topic of climate protection returned as a result of actions taken by Sweden, resulting in the UN Stockholm Conference (June 1972)[6] and the First World Climate Conference in Geneva (February 1979). Further activities in this area included subsequent conferences with scientists and politicians, e.g. in Toronto (June 1988) and Geneva (October-November 1990), as well as simultaneous UN activities to establish relevant organizations (e.g. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - IPCC - in December 1988). In parallel, since the 1960s and 1970s, the bottom-up activities of pro-environmental activists from organizations such as Greenpeace and WWF also began[7].

After the Convention came into force in 1994, it was expanded with additional protocols and agreements, including the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015-16). Within the framework of the Convention, annual United Nations Climate Change Conferences (the so-called Climate Summits) have also been held since 1995. In the social sphere (bottom-up movements), there has been a significant increase in climate protection activism since the second decade of the 21st century, manifested by such events as climate marches and strikes.

The analysis of the Convention using the "life cycle of norms" model is as follows:

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[5] The exception is the Holy See, which has observer status.

[6] The outcome of the Conference was the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (the so-called Stockholm Declaration), which was the first ever UN document dedicated to the environment.

[7] It is worth mentioning that both organizations were not initially focused directly on comprehensive climate protection - Greenpeace was founded as a protest against U.S. nuclear testing, while WWF was founded to protect wildlife.

1. The stage of norm emergence can be dated to the 1950s-80s, when the beginning and growth of the scientific community's interest in climate change occurred; in parallel, since the 1960s, some countries have also shown interest in climate issues;

2. The tipping point appeared around 1988 with the Toronto Conference, which initiated real action on climate change and can be seen as the beginning of the "norm cascade" in the sense of Finnemore and Sikkink; in addition, the IPCC began its work in 1988;

3. The "norm cascade" stage is associated with the drafting of the UNFCCC and its signing by 154 parties by June 14, 1992 (the remaining 11 signatures were made by June 1993);

4. The internalization stage involves ratification or other form of adoption of the Convention's rules by almost all states of the world by 2015[8].

On the surface, it may appear that the model fully works, but at each stage certain elements can be seen that perhaps do not so much undermine the validity of the model, but demonstrate some of its limitations and inaccuracies. Finnemore and Sikkink clearly point to the advancing change with each stage in the actors/entrepreneurs, the motives driving them and the mechanisms used to achieve the goals. In the case of the UNFCCC, or climate change action more broadly, the actors, motives and mechanisms are smoothly intertwined at each stage of the cycle. During the emergence of the norm (stage 1), one can distinguish both the actions of the scientific community, the political community (states) and pro-environmental social groups, with the motives of each group being more or less the same and dedicated to the desire to secure the future. Such a strong pluralism of actors reflects the difficulty in defining the "critical mass" at the tipping point - does this "critical mass" consist mainly of scientific, state or social circles? If only scientific, then how to treat the UN activities and the establishment of the IPCC? If only political, how to treat the conference in Toronto, where scientists were also important participants? Again, it is not possible to single out strictly bottom-up actors, because almost from the very beginning, states and global decision-making centers were also involved in the creation and promotion of standards.

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[8] Chronologically, the numbers of ratifications/acceptances on an annual basis are as follows: 1992 - 9; 1993 - 43; 1994 - 64; 1995 - 35; 1996 - 13; 1997 - 6; 1998 - 6; 1999 - 4; after 2000 - 17.

In the "norm cascade" stage (2), the trend of plurality of actors continues, but there is also a doubt about the "cascade" itself, since the vast majority of actors signed the Convention almost simultaneously (within more than a week, during the 1992 Earth Summit), and ratification proceeded at a pace that could be described as natural. The Convention entered into force according to Point 1 of its Article 23 "on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession." (UN, 1992), i.e. on 21 March 1994.It is also worth mentioning that it is difficult to find any pattern in the context of the states that signed and accepted the Convention and the dates of signatures and acceptances. Analogous findings can also be applied to the internalization stage (3).

Looking at the dynamics of events, we are dealing either with a very short time gap between the tipping point and stages 2 and 3, or with the incompatibility of the proposed model with the analysed case study, which may result from too much pluralism of actors and too much similarity of motives and actions, which makes it difficult to clearly distinguish the "critical mass" at the tipping point, which in turn leads to difficulty in unambiguously defining stages 2 and 3 and the elements constituting them.

A separate issue worth mentioning at this point is the currently growing role of bottom-up social movements in attempts at the real implementation of norms, which can be treated in two ways: 1) as a reversal of the cycle in terms of actors (the motivation of movements based on altruism, empathy and ideological commitment definitely fits into stage 1 of the cycle) or 2) as the beginning of a new, unrevealed and uncrystallized norm.

In addition to the above doubts, as in the case of the Ottawa Treaty, a significant difference between internalization, implementation, and actual state of affairs is noticeable. It is particularly visible in the context of the declared and real actions in the implementation of the objectives of the Convention, which is manifested by the attitude of the parties to the Paris Agreement[9], mentioned earlier.

The assumptions of the Paris Agreement include, first of all, the reduction of emissions of pollutants (so-called greenhouse gases; mainly CO_2) into the atmosphere in order to lower the global temperature growth and thus counteract global warming (UN, 2015). All parties to the UNFCCC have signed the Agreement (almost all of them have adopted it) and thus expressed their willingness to take action, but, as with the Kyoto Protocol, this is not translated into reality, as according to a recent

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[9] Equally, if not more interesting, would be the parties' attitude toward the Kyoto Protocol, but that expired definitively in 2020.

UN report analyzing the climate commitments of the various actors is not leading to achieve the goals (UN, 2021a; UN 2021b). Added to this is the Trump administration's declaration to withdraw the United States, one of the major CO_2 emitters, from the Agreement in 2020, which, although short-lived (the Biden administration rejoined the Agreement in 2021), is of great symbolic importance because the United States is a role model for many countries in the world and sets moral trends in foreign policy[10].

Conclusions

During the study, doubts about the lack of precision, excessive optimism and limitations in the possibility of implementation of the discussed concept were confirmed. The analysis of the characteristics indicates certain lack of precision and argumentation of the authors, which translates into a lack of precision of the model itself and provides grounds for its criticism. The analysis of the two case studies, on the other hand, indicates the model's incompatibility with all types of norms (e.g. international humanitarian law and climate protection commitments), as well as the authors' excessive optimism related to the internalization of norms. The latter point in particular leads to the conclusion that there are indeed significant differences between the declared internalisation or implementation of norms and the actual application of the principles derived from these norms.

The analysis also confirms the questions that have been repeatedly posed (although not raised in this text) concerning the nature of norms and, above all, the attributes of norms that influence their diffusion and the actual, sincere willingness to adopt and actually implement them, as well as the question concerning the primacy of the direct interests of the state (economic, political, geopolitical) and/or the state' s rulers over the moral issues arising from norms.

Nevertheless, despite the demonstrated flaws and doubts, it should be emphasized that the "life cycle of norms" by Finnemore and Sikkink still remains a valuable research model applicable to norms relating to human rights issues. This is due to the aforementioned clarity and simplicity in the presentation of the various stages, which allow for an understanding of the process of emergence and subsequent proliferation of international standards.

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[10] From the perspective of the Finnemore and Sikkink model, the United States, along with China, should be considered by all means a "critical state."

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Anniversary of the Taliban's seizure of power. Should lessons be learned?

Rocznica przejęcia władzy przez Talibów. Czy należy wyciągnąć wnioski?

Rahmattullah Nourozie
Badacz niezależny

It has been one year that the Taliban occupied power in Afghanistan and forced legally elected president and government to flee. This paper focuses on internal and external challenges for Afghanistan in the first anniversary of the Taliban coup and on the same type of challenges for the Taliban as governing power. Article also mentions and analyses potential threats for the regional and international community, because of unstable situation in Afghanistan.

It has been one year that the Taliban occupied power in Afghanistan. This article is looking to answer the questions that how the Taliban takeover Kabul on 15 Aug 2021? What are the internal/external challenges for the Taliban power as government? What are the threats that should be considered by the regional and international community?

Before answering the mentioned questions, I want to give a brief on the Taliban's patterns of governing after their re-occupation. Two decades before, in 1996-2001, the Taliban head their administration in Kabul. There was resistance in the northern provinces of Afghanistan, but they had their control over 95% of the territory. Their main objectives for administration were implementing Sharia, resistance against the innovations and development, introducing the frame for vanishing the modernization values. They also wanted to reverse Afghanistan's population to the way how the Prophet [ph] and Islamic Caliphs were living; one may say that Taliban are still looking in reverse, to the Prophet [ph]'s and the Caliphs ways, even if majority sees them as bygone. Taliban's insistence on the Islamic laws violates modern human rights, such as freedom of speech, which is one of the most essential value of being a human, to ask for the basic rights.

As Afghanistan International TV writes on Twitter, in a press conference on 22nd August 2022, Sadiq Akif Muhajir, the spokesman of Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahi An al-Munkar (Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice) told: "Hijab should not be thin, too fit and filmy, well suited, colorful and shouldn't be fragrant." (Twitter, 2022).

In the governmental sector, power and wealth is/was under control of the Taliban. They prefer not to share power as asked by international community and regional states to build inclusive government. Their slogan is that they have participated in wars against foreigners and they with their allies have the right to govern Afghanistan further. Taliban wants to strengthen their status for their fighter to be ready for any sort of violation which can be labeled as anti-Islamic act by their leaders. One of the ways, to achieve it is by isolating women from engagement of social, political, cultural and economic movements in their previous/ongoing government.

By 15th August 2021, the Taliban succeed to re-occupy Afghanistan, when president Ashraf Ghani flee the country with two of his near and dear ally – security adviser Hamdullah Mohib and head of the administrative office of the president Fazal Mahmood Fazli.

Although during the 2019, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalizad were looking to assign an agreement with the Taliban. They initiate propaganda that the Taliban have

changed. The outcome was a Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan signed 29th February 2020 – known as the Doha Agreement. Mike Pompeo in his remarks at the inauguration ceremony of the Doha agreement said that „the United States will never forget the solidarity of our many allies and partners who have stood with us in the long struggle to end this war. Today we also remember and honor them. Nor will the United States ever forget 9/11. We welcome the Taliban commitment not to host international terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, nor to allow them to use Afghan territory to train, recruit, or fundraise" (U.S. Embassy in Kabul, 2020). The Agreement had strengthened the Taliban soldiers in the battlefield and had negative impact of the Republic forces of being left betrayed by their foreign allies.

On the one hand, the Doha Agreement mentioned withdrawal date of the US troops from Afghanistan and not helping the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and other forces during the clash with the Taliban. That provision in the Agreement destroyed the motivation of the Afghan military forces. The other issues which weakened and put ANA in suffering were presence of inexperienced leaders in the security sector, ongoing wide range of corruption, „ghost soldiers" and the lack of co-ordinations for management of war equipment's and soldiers on the ground. All of those made war--effort harder for ANA, making it less willing to fight and less patient against enemies

According to the Washington Post, the Taliban had been killing Afghan forces throughout this, attempting to use the violence as leverage in negotiations, US intelligence officials believed (Philips, 2021).

In his speech on 19th May 2021, Khalizad told the congressional committee members that the key elements of US strategy is to achieve five goals:

1. Build International support for a political settlement through negotiations;
2. Encourage political unity among Afghan leaders;
3. Sustain military, political, and economic support for the Afghan Republic;
4. Incentivize the Taliban to reduce violence, accelerate negotiations for a political settlement, and agree to a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire;
5. And strengthen regional cooperation to against terror and enhance economic cooperation (U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, 2021).

In the end, none of this was achieved.

Shortly after those events, the destabilization in internal political situation was bolstered by nepotism and growth of influence and ambitions of the Pashtun leaders as the efforts of monopoly to avoid power-sharing and involvement of other ethni-

cities for making national interest decisions occurred, which consequently also reduced the chances of a better outcome for the republic's representatives in Doha for intra-Afghan talks.

Pashtuns are/were insisting that Afghanistan only belongs to Pashtuns. Other ethnicities have no-choice but to accept their leadership silently. As Kamal Nasir Osoli (then MP of Afghan parliament) has told in interview to Shamshad TV, if the Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek and other ethnicity want to stay in Afghanistan they should accept the Pashtun as the leaders and major ethnicity (YouTube, 2017).

On the other hand, the absence of clear strategy in respect to how to fight the Taliban was added to the complicated situation that had paved the way for the Taliban to re-occupy Afghanistan.

The most serious situation was created on 15th August 2021. Afghanistan lost all the governmental institutions, economic sectors, and all the two decades of democratic achievements in relation to human rights, involvement of women in different sector of social, economic, judicial, cultural, political and other governmental and non-governmental sectors.

The occupation has caused Afghanistan to lose the most essential element, which was the recognition of government by international community and other states. Now, although the Taliban has captured the government by force, but they are scrimmaging with the issue of recognition and relation with other states in the world. In the last one year, the Taliban could not bring changes as asked by the international and regional states to be recognized.

Internally, Taliban has failed to convince people for supporting their government. People are suffering poverty, economic crisis, insecurity, oppressive administration and violation of private freedom and human rights.

The Taliban cannot tolerate critics and tries to oppress the voice of women who were the only earned member in family, due to loses of their male member in suicide bomb attacks, road bombs or being killed by the Taliban as government employee during their campaign in the last two decades. For instance, the protests of women in Kabul on 14th August 2022 Kabul with the slogan of "food" "freedom" and "job" been organized, as Taliban have celebrated their anniversary, but this protest had been oppressed by them through firing, beating with lash and imprisoning protesters to prevent such situations in the future.

The protests have routes to the first days of occupation which were held in other provinces beside Kabul, but now the main focus is in Kabul due to limitations and

wide open hand of Taliban to target women in provinces. The ban of girls for the secondary and high school, plus avoiding the women to work in governmental sector are other issues which decrease the internal support for Taliban.

Another important dimension of internal Afghan problems is lack of inclusivity in governmental sectors. As was mentioned before, current power circles are dominated by Pashtuns, which situation creates unrest in other ethnical groups. Interestingly, official narration of Taliban and its particular officials, especially Maulvi Amir Khan Muttaqi, has always claimed that in Afghanistan they have an inclusive government.

Response to internal problems is resistance. Shortly after the Taliban came into power, many forces which include both "old" resistance groups (operating during the previous Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001) and "new" loyalists of the former government made an agreement and formed the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF), which operates in Panjshir region and other, mostly northern, provinces of Afghanistan. NRF is led by Ahmad Massud, son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, famous guerilla-fighter from time of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and has its own quasi-governmental institutions such as foreign affairs office; former vice-president of Afghanistan, Amrullah Saleh, proclaimed himself as a caretaker President of Afghanistan and leader of the Government in Exile. Internally, the resistance efforts are to convince the Taliban for accepting the diversion in Afghanistan and provide equal opportunities for all ethnic groups in this country.

Current external situation of Afghanistan is very difficult and complicated. One of the most important and influential powers is Pakistan. For the Taliban, it is a key ally that provided them shelter during their guerilla campaign against the Afghan and international forces, have started lobbying around the world to create consensus for their recognition. It is also who Pakistan hosted gathering of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Islamabad on 19th December 2021, where the Pakistani officials insisted, that international community should immediately help the people of Afghanistan (Relifweb.int, 2022). Shortly after this kind of statements, Pakistan found, that the Taliban cannot be trustable as a partner and relations between both states became a little less cordially.

From the Western countries it was Norway, who organized the conference where the Taliban was asked to join and participate. A joint meeting in January 2022 was aimed to de-escalate the conflict and start a dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan opposition with the support of experts and authorities from Norway (Government of Norway, 2022). Later, Norwegian officials confessed that due to the acts

of the Taliban, they have lost hopes. Under the new consensus, the United Nation Security Council have cancelled the travel permit of Noorullah Munir and Abdul Baqi Haqqani that under the Taliban they lead the ministry of education and ministry of higher education.

The main challenges from external aspect for the Taliban are facing challenged to recognition the human rights, support for women and provide them opportunity to work, reopening the schools for secondary/high education, and share the power with other ethnicities, beside respecting the diversities in Afghanistan's society by building inclusive government. It is a challenge that has increased suspicion on the faith of Taliban to accept and implement the modern values in Afghanistan. The implementation of at least some of the above demands would significantly facilitate international recognition of Afghanistan, which would help improve the lot of the people.

However, beside the above-mentioned issues, as was also mentioned before, the Taliban are an ethnical movement of Pashtuns and they are influenced by the Pashtunwali codes. Their organization is based on self-interpreted Islamic values, which also have roots in the influence of Pashtunwali codes. If they want to build government with the modern values, they have no choice but to violate the principle of Pashtunwali codes and re-explain them for harmonization with the modern value. That is a challenge to happen due to the militarized movement and the Taliban's radical perspective. On the other side, the changes will conclude a price for the leaders of the Taliban, that they might lose control over the soldiers. Leaders cannot risk losing control over their fighters.

The Taliban are entangled in an inflation between realism and radicalism. On the one hand, the presence of Haqqani organization (Haqqani Network) with the high support of ISI (Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence), ironic ties with the Al-Qaida and the Kandahari, who has the experience of leading Afghanistan in the last two century. On the other hand, presence of other terrorist groups such as Islamic Movement of Turkistan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and others, who support Uyghurs in Chinese border have helped them during the guerilla wars. It has complicated the situation for the Taliban to implement the changes that international and regional states asks for. The presence of these groups has affected the policies of regional and international power to reconsider regarding the relation with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The emergence of Islamic States-Khorasan (IS-K) branch as their enemy have weakened the Taliban for the implementation of the international demands. If they

fail to convince their fighters, what would be the reaction of foreigner terrorist fighters present inside Afghanistan? They have the choice to switch from the Taliban to IS-K, which pursues more radical Islamic ideology.

Although the Taliban still have succeeded to have control on their fighters, despite the fragile economy, if the changes happen soon each group and the homogeneous fighter may seek to join their enemy – IS-K. And that makes the internal situation more dangerous, and this scenario can point serious terroristic threats, launching operational plans to operating and targeting the regional and international goals in near future. For the regional and international community, trusting the Taliban, who are tribal forces and proxy warriors of different secret agencies and terrorist groups, will be more costly. Internal threats for the Taliban may imply more barbaric brutality that the international community and those who believe that the Taliban have changed, will be surprised.

Conclusion

After the Taliban have re-occupied Afghanistan on 15th August 2021, despite propaganda, that the Taliban have changed, many facts indicates, that their new administration have not changed at all. They still believe that women should stay back home instead of working and has banned the secondary and high schools for the girls.

The Taliban have claimed that Afghanistan is secure, but internally the bombing of Hazara minority as Shia's mosques and Sufi gathering in Kabul, plus the target killing has increased during first year of occupation.

Afghani people are suffering poverty, economic crisis, oppressive administration, controlled media, ban of freedom for speech, ban of freedom for women clothing, ban of criticizing their government, ban of travel for women which insist on having a man with are the issues that has limited the movement in this country. The Taliban has introduced Islamic conditions as the frame that all Afghani people should fit. For the Taliban, being Muslim should be a reason for pride and Muslims should ,decorate their faces and faith' or they will not be governmental employees.

The Taliban are a collection of terrorist groups with radical interpretation of Islamic values and the Pashtunwali codes. Their administration in Afghanistan created the opportunity for the world terrorism and drug dealers for recruiting soldiers, train and plan for operation from Afghanistan to any corner of the world due to vacuum of responsible government in Kabul.

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Wojna w Ukrainie szansą na pożegnanie hegemonii Stanów Zjednoczonych?

Rozmowa Sylwii Jasińskiej z Bogusławem Gogolem

War in Ukraine a chance to bid farewell to U.S. hegemony?
An interview by Sylwia Jasińska with Bogusław Gogol

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W jaki sposób rosyjska inwazja na Ukrainę wpłynie na sytuację międzynarodową i politykę Rosji?

Gdyby do tego podejść w taki sposób, żebyśmy wiedzieli, jaki będzie koniec tej inwazji, która rozpoczęła się 24 lutego, to ta odpowiedź byłaby prostsza. Problem polega na tym, że my tej odpowiedzi nie znamy, a tak naprawdę trzeba powiedzieć, że jest kilka aspektów tego zagadnienia. Wydaje mi się, że pierwszym aspektem jest to, że doszło do odnowienia procesu, który kilkadziesiąt lat temu zwany był „zimną wojną", kiedy istniało napięcie pomiędzy Związkiem Radzieckim a mocarstwem, którym były Stany Zjednoczone. Mamy tutaj podobną sytuację, ale powiem szczerze, mam problem z oceną, w jakim miejscu jesteśmy, bo nie możemy tego porównać do Kryzysu Kubańskiego w czasach Chruszczowa, nie można tego nawet porównać do innych wydarzeń, które były zaognieniem sytuacji np. '56 rok, czyli wkroczenie wojsk sowieckich na Węgry i stłumienie powstania węgierskiego, czy '68 rok sytuacja w Czechosłowacji, czy '79, czyli wkroczenie ZSRR do Afganistanu. Tutaj mamy sytuację, kiedy wydawałoby się, że po okresie zimnej wojny świat poszedł w kierunku świata najpierw jednobiegunowego, w którym najważniejsze kwestie były podejmowane właściwie z inicjatywy Stanów Zjednoczonych. Teraz mamy ten świat wielobiegunowy i Rosja jest elementem tego świata. I teraz to pytanie jest bardzo ważne, my nie znamy końca tego procesu, który się rozpoczął w lutym 2022 roku. Wydaje się, że ten proces jest wypadkową samej polityki Rosji, która pozostała mocarstwem, ale raczej w sferze militarnej. W sterze gospodarczej nikt tej Rosji jako państwa, które jest mocarstwem, nie postrzega. Przecież to państwo było mocarstwem jeszcze jako Związek Radziecki i Rosja w pewnym sensie przeżywała od momentu upadku ZSRR do końca pierwszej dekady XXI wieku coś w rodzaju zapaści – zaczęła się jednak zmieniać w czasie prezydentury Władimira Putina. On część sytuacji rozstrzygał siłowo – pacyfikacja Czeczeni i powołanie okrutnego reżimu Kadyrowa, a w zasadzie drugiego Kadyrowa (syna), posłusznego wasala a właściwie „watażki", który jest na każde życzenie Putina. Władimir Putin tworzył także tę otoczkę wokół państw Związku Sowieckiego.

Jak Rosja postrzega swoje strefy wpływów?

Pamiętamy te dwa pojęcia: bliska i bliższa zagranica, czyli uzależnienie tych państw od Rosji. Współpraca odbierana jest jako coś niezbędnego i jeszcze przed tą agresją Rosja wysyłała siły, można powiedzieć, stabilizacyjne do Kazachstanu. Rosja ciągle ma uzależnioną od siebie, a leżącą bli-

sko nas Białoruś i to uzależnienie wzrasta. Łukaszenka wie to doskonale jako człowiek, który jest persona non grata w wielu miejscach na świecie i którego nikt w mediach zachodnich nie nazwie prezydentem, tylko dyktatorem. Ja patrzę na ten proces jako powstrzymywanie przez Rosję kolorowych rewolucji, czyli sytuacji, w której demokracja i liberalizm wkracza w pewną pozycję Rosji. Co może zrobić mocarstwo, które dysponuje siła militarną – w pierwszym rzędzie – a po drugie surowcami? Użyć tego jako a) formy bezpośredniego nacisku, czyli po prostu wojny, b) może użyć tych surowców, licząc na to, że wiele państw, zwłaszcza Europy Zachodniej, uzależnionych od tych surowców, nie zdecyduje się na to żeby z Rosją współpracę zerwać. Rosja stała się państwem, które w pewnym sensie liczy także na jeszcze jedną bardzo istotną rzecz – rywalizację Wschód-Zachód, rozumianą inaczej teraz, po zimnej wojnie. Wiemy czym jest BRICS i wiemy, że ta współpraca się rozszerza. To są także rezultaty tych działań z ostatnich dni i tygodni, kiedy my żyliśmy w przeświadczeniu, że Rosja jest całkowicie izolowana. Tymczasem sytuacja BRICS o tym nie świadczy. Kraje Ameryki Południowej takie jak Argentyna wykazują ogromną obojętność wobec tego, co się dzieje w Europie i przystępują do BRICS. Mamy Iran, który stanie się członkiem-sympatykiem, może inaczej, członkiem w perspektywie, ale na pewno jest sympatykiem tej struktury. Mamy Indie, które opowiadają się za BRICS'em, czyli delikatnie mówiąc wcale nie interesuje ich to, co dzieje się w Ukrainie. Padło ostatnio w mediach, ale także w publicystyce takie bardzo istotne stwierdzenie: kraje Europy Zachodniej i kraje cywilizacji anglosaskiej, czyli w tym przypadku Stany Zjednoczone to jest około 700-800 milionów ludzi, a kraje BRICS to jest parę miliardów ludzi. Tutaj oczywiście trzeba wymienić Chiny i Indie, a trzeba dodać do tego jeszcze Indonezję, Malezję, czyli można powiedzieć dużą część Azji, gdzie kraje te traktują to jako szansę na pożegnanie się z hegemonią Stanów Zjednoczonych.

Czy wojna na Ukrainie zmienia porządek międzynarodowy?

Ten konflikt, który dotyczy największego państwa w Europie – Ukrainy – ma o wiele szerszy kontekst i pokazuje bardzo mocne punkty iskrzące we współczesnym świecie, a także to, że mamy świat wielobiegunowy, w którym często słyszymy jedną rzecz „Stany Zjednoczone nie będą dyk-

tować nam takich warunków, które powodują, że my czujemy się słabsi". To bardzo trudno analizować, bo gdybym przykładał taką prostą kalkę, którą można powiedzieć przyłożyliby realiści, czyli jeżeli widzimy wobec nas stosowaną siłę, to odpowiemy podobnie. Proszę jednak pamiętać, że w przypadku klasycznego realizmu mamy coś takiego jak podłączanie czy przyłączanie i teraz to widać. Wbrew pozorom stroną militarnie silniejszą jest Rosja i teraz czy ktokolwiek ze świata BRICS powiedział Rosji „zatrzymajcie się, nie dokonujcie tej agresji"? Nie, czegoś takiego nie ma. To jest sprawa, która się toczy między byłą republiką ZSRR i tą dużą republiką, którą stała się Rosja. Jak wiadomo, sytuacja za naszą wschodnią granicą jest skomplikowana.

Jakie siły rywalizują ze sobą w tle wojny na Ukrainie?

Jeszcze raz powtórzę, to się rozgrywa na pewnych płaszczyznach - świat zachodni, świat z cywilizacji powiedziałbym tej jeszcze postzimnowojennej, obok tego mamy konflikt. Po jednej stronie znowu są państwa zachodnie, a po drugiej oczywiście jest w tym wypadku coś takiego jak państwa BRICS, które zawsze były traktowane jako coś gorszego i słabszego. Są tam też byłe kolonie, są też państwa tak jak Indie. Przecież należy pamiętać, że były one zależne przez stulecia od Wielkiej Brytanii. Chiny, które zawsze traktowane były jako kraj bardzo ludny, ale kraj, który był gdzieś w tyle – nie jeśli chodzi o rozwój cywilizacyjny, bo to jest coś zupełnie innego, ale jako potęga gospodarcza. Chiny, które kiedyś się zamknęły, teraz już takie nie są i szybko nadrabiają. Podsumowując, mamy militarną potęgę Rosji, Chiny z technologią i gospodarką oraz ogromnym zapleczem ludnościowym, Indie, które to samo mogą wkrótce osiągnąć, więc nagle okazuje się, że ten świat cywilizacji zachodniej staje się czymś, no dosyć drastycznie samotnym.

Czy Zachód ma szansę zakończyć konflikt na Ukrainie w sposób pozytywny dla siebie?

Naprawdę trudno byłoby odpowiedzieć w sposób jednoznaczny, jak ten konflikt się zakończy. Rosja potencjalnie może z niego wyjść osłabiona, jak i może z niego wyjść wzmocniona dlatego, że surowce rosyjskie będą ku-

pować Chiny, ale na takich warunkach, jakie one będą chciały. Tutaj wydaje się, że te ostatnie miesiące – szczególnie maj i czerwiec – pokazały, że po pierwsze sankcje, które wydawały się bardzo skuteczną bronią, ale zawsze zastrzegano, że one będą działać po jakimś czasie... No wydaje się, że nie są tak skuteczne jak by mogły być. Rosja nie jest taka samotna, jakby mogło to wyglądać. Instytucje międzynarodowe nie są w stanie zmusić Rosji do zaprzestania tego, co się na Ukrainie dzieje, a Rosja mówi jedno „to jest nasza strefa wpływów i my chcemy tę strefę wpływów potwierdzić". Zachód, NATO, nie będzie nam się, za przeproszeniem, zbliżał do naszej stolicy, Moskwy, bo przecież to jest główne hasło Putina. „NATO przybliżyło się o kilkaset kilometrów do Moskwy jeżeli chodzi o możliwości, które chciałoby uzyskać". Z jednej strony wiemy, że NATO rzeczywiście rozszerzy się wkrótce o kraje takie jak Szwecja i Finlandia, to co zawsze podkreślała Rosja - nie możemy dopuścić do tego, żeby Ukraina znalazła się w NATO. Myślę, że to tyle, bo można by jeszcze mówić na temat aspiracji ukraińskich do wejścia do Unii Europejskiej i to się w jakiejś mierze zaczęło, ale jaki będzie tego rezultat, zobaczymy. Sytuacja jest bardzo skomplikowana. Moim zdaniem jest bardzo groźna, a konsekwencje tego co się wydarzy są trudne do przewidzenia.

Jakie konsekwencje dla Unii Europejskiej i NATO może mieć prorosyjska polityka Węgier?

Tutaj odpowiedź będzie krótsza. Wydaje się, że premier Węgier, Orbán, który rządzi w tym państwie nieprzerwanie jako premier od 2010 roku ma najwięcej do powiedzenia i buduje system, który jest nastawiony na wzorzec miękkiego autorytaryzmu. Fidesz jako partia, którą on całkowicie steruje, odchodzi od wzorca państwa klasycznie demokratycznego. Odejście od wolnych mediów, pacyfikacja części elity intelektualnej i w tym wypadku oczywiście także tych wszystkich mechanizmów, które dotyczą poszanowania praw człowieka – klasyczny populista, który wie jedno – liczy się dla niego ekonomia i zysk. Tę ekonomię i zysk łączy z Władimirem Putinem, te relacje są rzeczywiście nadzwyczaj dobre. Pamiętamy, że nawet po wyborach, kiedy to Fidesz uzyskuje większość, Orbán stwierdził, iż jednym z przeciwników był między innymi Zełenski. Zostało to tak przynajmniej przekazane.

Dlaczego Węgry tak postępują?

Węgry idą trochę, powiedziałbym, innym kursem niż całość Unii Europejskiej. To jest widoczne od lat, ale to jest ten klasyczny „orbánowy" populizm. Nie wiem, jak go czytać do końca i do czego to może doprowadzić w tym wypadku, jeżeli chodzi o politykę węgierską. Z drugiej strony powiem coś, co może zabrzmieć bardzo dziwnie: zawsze dobrze jest, jak nawet w naszej drużynie jest ktoś, kto trochę przyjaźniej patrzy w nie w tę stronę – mówię tu o Rosji. Być może on się przyda przy jakichś kwestiach związanych ze ścieżkami dyplomatycznymi, którymi trzeba byłoby pójść, aby łatwiej z Rosją zacząć rozmawiać w przyszłości, bo w pewnym momencie i tak, jeżeli to będzie się nadal toczyło, będzie trzeba zacząć rozmawiać.

Czy to, że we Francji przy władzy został Emmanuel Macron wpłynie na politykę wobec Federacji Rosyjskiej?

Prezydent Macron to jest znowu inna bajka. Jego wyprawy do Rosji tuż przed konfliktem, jego rozmowy z Putinem, które są ciągle kontynuowane, bo to on mówił, że trzeba rozmawiać... Sądzę, że dobrze się stało, że z dwójki kandydatów nie została prezydentem pani Le Pen w kwietniowych wyborach, bo wtedy byśmy mieli sytuację być może analogiczną do Orbána. Tylko że to już nie byłoby zabawne, bo porównując potencjał Węgier, które mogą być takim złym drogowskazem, a potencjał Francji, która jest jednak tym filarem Unii Europejskiej, to wiemy, jak to wygląda. Kraj NATO-wski, który zresztą chyba do jakiegoś stopnia miał bardzo dużo różnych przykładów takiego filorosyjskiego zachowania swego czasu – w historii i wśród artystów. Pamiętamy Gérarda Depardieu, który, żeby nie płacić podatków dostał obywatelstwo od Władimira Władimirowicza, którego się chyba ostatecznie zrzekł i wycofał się z tego, co czynił. Rosjanie i Francuzi mimo incydentów z dziewiętnastowieczną wyprawą Napoleona na Moskwę i potem oczywiście wojskami rosyjskimi, które tłumiły napoleońskie wojska, mieli w miarę dobre relacje. Przynajmniej dosyć szybko ze sobą się te państwa dogadywały, co nie znaczy, że zawsze współpracowały. Przypomnę wojnę krymską, gdzie jednym z przeciwników Rosji, ówczesnej carskiej Rosji, była między innymi Francja. Teraz tutaj jest pytanie jak będzie powstawał Macron? Nie sądzę żeby Francja nie chciała dalej rozmawiać z Rosją. Może z pewną osobistą niechęcią z Putinem, ale będą prowadzić rozmowy. Wydaje mi się, że Francja lubi się odnajdywać

w takich sytuacjach, kiedy jest mediatorem, lubi mieć coś do powiedzenia. Oczywiście na razie nic nie udało się załatwić, na razie wiadomym jest, że Francuzi nie mogą mówić o jakimś sukcesie, ale sądzę, że Francuzi nigdy nie odejdą od stołu rokowań. Chyba że wydarzy się już totalna katastrofa. Macron ma pewien problem związany z tym, że wybory parlamentarne jego partii nie poszły tak dobrze, jak kampania prezydencka. Oznacza to jedno: kohabitację z innymi ugrupowaniami, a francuski prezydent wolałby jednak czystą sytuację. Z drugiej strony pamiętajmy jeszcze jedną rzecz, że to jest ostatnia kadencja Macrona i on może być bardziej zdecydowany w swoich działaniach, o ile to nie będzie oznaczało oczywiście kapitulanctwa. Francuzi wiele rzeczy lubią załatwiać nie na polu walki, ale po prostu przy stole negocjacyjnym.

Czy jest możliwe, że państwa szeroko pojętego Zachodu zrezygnują z rosyjskich węglowodorów?

To jest trudne pytanie. Mimo upływu czasu wiemy, że Rosja ciągle otrzymuje bardzo dużo pieniędzy ze sprzedaży surowców. Nawet jeżeli nie znajdzie nabywców na rynku europejskim, tak jak było do tej pory, to znajdzie ich w Azji, chociażby w Chinach. Rosja jest państwem, które na pewno trudno jest tak bezboleśnie usunąć państwom europejskim, jeżeli chodzi o te paliwa ze swego biznesowego planu. Jeżeli chcemy być konsekwentni, to musimy się w tym wypadku utrzymywać, musimy szukać tych źródeł zaopatrzenia. To, co jest oczywiste to to, że ten węgiel był stosunkowo tani, ale niestety trzeba sobie bez niego radzić. My musimy w tym momencie myśleć o węglu być może z Mozambiku, być może z Australii, bo przecież stamtąd też możemy sprowadzać. Będzie to na pewno droższe rozwiązanie, no i być może nie myśleć o zamykaniu polskich kopalń. Na szczęście już wcześniej zaczęliśmy dywersyfikację dostaw gazu. Za dwa-trzy miesiące będziemy musieli zwracać uwagę na temperaturę na zewnątrz. Nie wiem, czy da się w tym momencie tak od razu od tego wszystkiego, co Rosja sprzedawała odejść. Będzie to na pewno kosztowne i w tę stronę należy jednak pójść, ponieważ my wiemy, że po 3 miesiącach ten sukces sankcji nie jest taki, jak się spodziewano i Rosja ciągle mogła liczyć na dostawę gotówki, którą mogła dysponować. To jest droga, którą chyba musimy podążać. Chyba że coś się zmieni i zakończy się ta wojna.

Jak powinniśmy patrzeć na dalszą politykę sankcji wobec Rosji?

Sankcje na razie się zwiększają, ale proszę też pamiętać, że 24 lutego i trochę wcześniej mówiono, że jeżeli będą sankcje, to one nie zadziałają w ciągu miesiąca, dwóch czy trzech – na to potrzeba trochę czasu. Rosja też musi to odczuć. Jeżeli mamy 97% spadek produkcji samochodów w Rosji, do tego co było produkowane przez przed wybuchem wojny, to znaczy, że te sankcje w jakiejś mierze działają. Nie wiem, czy tu są liczone samochody ciężarowe, samochody dla wojska czy tylko cywilne, ale tak to wygląda, czyli brakuje Rosji, powiedziałbym, komponentów.

Czy istnieje szansa, że Władimir Putin oraz odpowiedzialne za wojnę rosyjskie elity zostaną osądzone za popełnione zbrodnie wojenne?

Jeżeli istnieje sprawiedliwość po drugiej stronie naszego bytu, to ja mogę w to wierzyć. Powiem uczciwie: kto zmusi Rosję, nawet jeżeli nie będzie rządził tam Putin, do tego, aby prezydent czy nawet były prezydent stanął przed jakimkolwiek międzynarodowym trybunałem? Nie wierzę w coś takiego, to się nawet na pewno nie stanie. Nie mamy tu przegranej wojny, kiedy ktoś wywiesza białą flagę, kapituluje i możemy osądzić tych, którzy dokonali zbrodni, tak jak się to stało stosunku do Miloševicia, który stanął w końcu przed Trybunałem. Jednak wiemy, że ten wyrok nie został wydany, a chodziło tutaj o jego działania na terenie Bośni i Hercegowiny czy chociażby w Kosowie. Tutaj nie mamy żadnej odpowiedzialności, która by się stała, bo to los znowu tak sprawił, że Milošević z tego świata odszedł. Proszę też pamiętać, że nawet jeżeli istnieje Trybunał Karny, to Rosja pod niego nie podlega. Tak samo jak Stany Zjednoczone powiedziały, że nie będzie możliwości sądzenia ich obywateli przed trybunałem ONZ. Wątpię, aby udało się postawić decydentów Rosji odpowiedzialnych za to, co się stało czy stanie przed Trybunałem. Mało realne, chyba że zrobi się proces o charakterze zaocznym, w którym oczywiście zapadną pewne wyroki i być może to jest też instrument do tego, aby pokazać jak wyglądają zbrodnie, jak potępia się ludobójstwo i zbrodnie przeciwko ludzkości czy zbrodnie wojenne. Ponieważ tutaj mamy pełną gamę tego typu zjawisk. Moim zdaniem sam Władimir Putin nie będzie za to odpowiadał osobiście przed żadnym Trybunałem. To nie jest Saddam Husajn, to nie jest jakikolwiek dyktator, którego łatwo będzie pochwycić i przed takim Trybunałem postawić. Taką będziemy mieli drogę jak kiedyś z innymi dyk-

tatorami, którzy byli za duzi, żeby cokolwiek im uczynić, którzy nie przegrali wojny, którzy nie musieli stanąć przed Trybunałem. Norymberga czy proces tokijski tu się nie powtórzy, inne procesy mogą być tylko możliwe w formule zaocznej. Chociaż jak wiemy dokumentacja z tego co się dzieje jest gromadzona i być może będzie kiedyś wykorzystana.

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Wywiad z Bogusławem Gogolem został przeprowadzony 127 dnia inwazji Rosji na Ukrainę (30/06/2022)

Recenzja

Agnieszka Kościańska, Michał Petryk, Odejdź. Rzecz o polskim rasizmie (Go away. A thing about Polish racism), *Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, Warszawa 2022, ss. 256.*

Spośród wielu publikacji popularnonaukowych, jakie co roku pojawiają się na naszym rynku wydawniczym niezbyt często trafia się tak udana książka jak „Odejdź. Rzecz o polskim rasizmie" autorstwa dwojga badaczy i podróżników, a przy okazji pracowników naukowych – Agnieszki Kościańskiej – i tłumaczy – Michała Petryka. Kombinacja naukowo-literacka oraz wspólne doświadczenia autorów dają fanatyczny efekt narracyjno-poznawczy tej publikacji. W naturalny bowiem sposób warsztat metodologiczny oraz wrażliwość wynikająca z charakteru pracy obojga wpływa na jakość analiz i wieńczących je refleksji. Składająca się z siedmiu rozdziałów i rozdziału kończącego książeczka liczy raptem 215 stron, bez podziękowań i przypisów końcowych, a wydana została przez Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej latem 2022 roku.

Najnowsza propozycja wydawnicza Kościańskiej i Petryka porusza temat, jaki wydaje się być tyleż samo abstrakcyjny, co przemilczany lub ignorowany, czyli rasizmu w Polsce czy też polskiego rasizmu. Jak sami autorzy wyjaśniają w pierwszej części pod znamiennym tytułem „Nie ma rasy. Jest tylko rasizm" ich badania, obserwacje i, w rezultacie, prezentowana książka powstała w wyniku głębokiej refleksji nad podejściem do tego, czym jest rasa

i rasizm w tej części Europy oraz jak są one definiowane lub postrzegane w tzw. odbiorze społecznym. Sposób postrzegania tych kwestii uwikłany jest bowiem w polski dyskurs o historii i kolonializmie w XX wieku. Zupełnie zaś oderwany, nieco ironicznie, od kontekstu zjawisk migracji czy doświadczeń homogenizacji narodowej w poprzednim stuleciu, jak i dyskusji o uchodźcach już w pierwszych dekadach XXI wieku.

W kolejnych częściach autorzy opisują i analizują polski dyskurs o rasizmie od czasów końca XIX wieku, czyli kształtowania się nowoczesnej idei państwa polskiego oraz jego struktur, przez Polskę czasów międzywojennych, następnie narrację obowiązującą w czasach Polski Ludowej, aż po lata transformacji ustrojowej końca XX wieku i tzw. kryzys uchodźczy pod koniec poprzedniej dekady obecnego stulecia.

Autorzy podają liczne cytaty z prasy wydawanej w poszczególnych omawianych okresach, kreślą sylwetki osób zaangażowanych w ten dyskurs i oddają im głos reprezentujący szerokie spektrum stanowisk, aż po teksty literackie stanowiące egzemplifikację nastrojów społecznych względem zjawiska rasizmu, jak i osób, których on dotykał.

Trzy kluczowe wątki, jakie przeplatają się w tej publikacji, odnoszą się do kwestii: kolonii zamorskich i stosunku do mieszkających tam narodów, zagadnienia rasizmu w USA oraz w państwach tzw. demokracji ludowej (w tym w Polski) oraz stosunku Polaków i ich włodarzy do Romów w poszczególnych okresach XX wieku.

Ciekawe jest zwrócenie uwagi czytelników na instrumentalne wykorzystanie kwestii rasizmu w kreśleniu linii podziału między Europą a Ameryką, a nawet między państwami satelickimi ZSRR a tzw. kapitalistycznym światem zachodu. Autorzy zaryzykowali także i pokusili się nie tylko na wskazanie przyczyn takiej instrumentalizacji, bo te są dość oczywiste, ale o wejście w dość trudną nadal dyskusję o skutkach, jakie do dzisiaj wybrzmiewają w głosach polityków w Polsce w wyniku takiego indoktrynalnego ukazywania rasizmu oraz formatowania i homogenizowania społeczeństwa w okresie między 1945 a 1989 rokiem. Wskazują przy tym, że owa instrumentalizacja polityczna zjawiska rasizmu i towarzyszące jej manipulacje są wciąż obecne w tych wypowiedziach, jak i rezonują w reakcjach społecznych.

Każdy z tych wątków pozwala autorom na nakreślenie szerokiego kontekstu historycznego, społecznego, politycznego czy ekonomicznego i ukazanie kwestii rasizmu na gruncie polskim tak w przeszłości, jak i współcześnie.

Wartością dodaną książki są ilustracje towarzyszące omawianym kwestiom. Chociaż nie jest to publikacja droga i co

za tym idzie kategoria papieru oraz zamieszczone zdjęcia są dość marnej jakości, to i tak oddają ducha zagadnień, których dotyczą. Nie jest ich niestety również zbyt wiele.

Szacunek badacza wzbudza natomiast bibliografia wyrażona w przypisach, a zważywszy na fakt, że nie jest to praca sensu stricto naukowa, ale raczej stawiająca na walor edukacyjny i naukowo- po-

pularyzatorski, to kwerenda źródeł i ich wykorzystanie są imponujące.

Jest to z pewnością jedna z tych książek, jakie warto przeczytać choćby po to, aby rozumieć, co dzieje się wokół i jakie są przyczyny zjawisk gorąco dyskutowanych nie tylko w Polsce, ale i na świecie. No i żeby polemizować, trzeba jednak temat poznać! Do czego gorąco zachęcam.

Keywords: racism, reportage, Polish society.

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